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___________________________________ 
 
Abstract: International policy-making promises to empower women in Bosnia through 
encouraging their participation in the political process, giving them voice in civil 
society and through providing enhanced opportunities for economic independence. 
This paper challenges these claims, suggesting that while a narrow echelon of young 
middle class urban professionals have benefited from international gender approaches, 
the prospects for ordinary Bosnian women have not. First, the paper considers 
international attempts to promote the political empowerment of women through quota 
mechanisms and support for women‟s organisations operating in civil society. 
Secondly, the paper considers international policies intended to further the economic 
empowerment of women and how these relate to broader neo-liberal prescriptions for 
the post-war state. It concludes that international policies, in both the political and 
economic realms, contain fundamental limitations which look likely to frustrate the 
long-term advancement of women in Bosnia. 
___________________________________ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This essay considers international gender policies and prospects they offer for the 
women of Bosnia (BiH) moving beyond post-conflict stabilization. Gender 
empowerment has become a standard tool of international peacebuilding in post-
conflict societies and BiH is no exception in this respect. Maximising the public role 
of women, whether as voters, journalists, political representatives or women‟s 
organisations is viewed as useful to undermine the power of nationalist parties and 
promote a more tolerant non-violent, political culture. Voter education, gender quotas, 
media training and broadening the political role of women‟s organisations have been 
pursued in numerous initiatives. 
The Dayton settlement itself did not address the issue of gender, but 
considerable international attention has been given to the issue since then. To pursue 
gender empowerment more systematically, a Gender Co-ordination Group was 
established, chaired by the OHR, with representatives from the OSCE, OHCHR 
(Office of the High Commission for Human Rights), the International Human Rights 
Law Group and other international organisations. Its remit includes implementing the 
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Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and 
integrating the gender dimension into „national legislation, public policies, 
programmes and projects‟.1 A complimentary project, Gender Equity and Equality 
Project (GEEP) is supported by the Finnish government and operates through the 
Gender Centre of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Gender 
Centre of Republika Srpska (RS).
2
 Both projects helped sponsor a Law on Gender 
Equality, passed in 2003,
3
 codifying international gender thinking and building on ad 
hoc measures such as electoral gender quotas.  
The Law on Gender Equality has been followed up by a two-year $400,000 
project dedicated to its implementation supported by UNDP as the lead international 
organisation together with UNICEF, OHCHR, UNFPA and the ILO under the UN 
Gender Group. Importantly they have been working with the Ministry for Human 
Rights and Refugees (MHRR), the Entity Gender Centres and NGOs to establish a 
state-level gender agency.  Initiatives also include gender awareness campaigns and 
„training of trainers (judges, teachers, NGO officials, etc)‟ and other capacity building 
activities addressing gender equality and the elimination of gender-based violence.
4
 
Meanwhile international microcredit programmes have often been directed towards 
women. The UNDP and other international organisations are keen to emphasise how 
their own programmes incorporate a gender dimension and how they strive towards a 
gender balance among their own employees.
5
  
 Below I consider international policies intended to politically empower 
women, analysing the impact of the quota system for appointment to government 
bodies and for political party candidate lists, and then go on to consider the role of 
internationally-funded in women‟s groups in political advocacy. The following 
section considers international strategy aimed at enhancing the economic 
empowerment of women, focusing on the rise of micro-credit initiatives and the 
encouragement of small businesses. 
  
Political empowerment?  
 
International gender policy has sought to redress discrimination against women in the 
political sphere. The war‟s impact on the number of female political representatives 
has been dramatic. Before the war, apparently 24.1 percent of the representatives in 
the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 17.3 percent of the 
representatives in the municipal assemblies were women.
6
 However, the number of 
women in parliament sharply plummeted in the first Bosnian elections held after the 
war. Women‟s strong presence in the NGO sector failed to translate into greater 
political representation. To cite just one figure, a solitary woman gained a seat out of 
the 42 seats in the Bosnian House of Representatives.
7
 Concern too has been 
expressed that economic crisis and war have undermined women‟s participation in the 
workplace. Large-scale unemployment, it is feared, has encouraged thinking receptive 
to a more gendered division of labour along with the ethnicised divisions. 
These reversals have encouraged international officials to adopt a more 
proactive approach. The Law on Gender Equality does not confine itself to outlawing 
gender-based discrimination, direct or indirect. Instead the law incorporates an 
affirmative approach requiring gender parity in the allocation of public posts. 
Crucially Article 15 sets out the principle of equal gender representation in public life: 
 
State and local authority bodies, corporate management bodies, political 
parties and other non-profit organizations shall ensure and promote equal 
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representation on the basis of gender in management and the decision-
making process…[T]he percentage of the sexes in government bodies at 
all levels, including the judiciary, legislature and executive, as well as all 
other public services, committees, boards, and bodies representing the 
state at the international level, shall as a rule reflect the equal gender 
representation (emphasis added).
8
 
 
The requirement for equal gender representation has huge implications for public life 
in BiH. Post-conflict BiH is effectively expected to implement more radical fast track 
measures than Britain, the High Representative Paddy Ashdown‟s own state, or the 
incremental track deployed in the Scandinavian countries.
9
 Britain would have 
difficulty in demonstrating equal gender representation at any level let alone at all 
levels of government and the public services. British government bodies, public 
services, private sector institutions and corporations would fall foul of this article. 
Moreover, the principle of gender parity compliments constitutional provisions 
codifying ethnic representation in public life. Consequently gender parity will have to 
be implemented taking into account the extensive quota requirements which exist for 
ethnic representation. Achieving gender parity and the required ethnic representation 
would only be possible with complex bureaucratic planning.  
The Law on Gender Equality builds on various affirmative action initiatives 
seeking to challenge the political and cultural marginalisation of women. A Women in 
Politics programme was set up by the OSCE, delegated responsibility for supervising 
elections under Dayton. As part of its programme, the OSCE changed the electoral 
rules and required 30 percent of the candidates to be women on candidate lists. The 
measure did increase the number of women representatives in elected bodies. The 
percentage of women in the House of Representatives leapt up from a miserable 2.38 
percent to a much more respectable 26 percent under a closed list system
10
, although 
the figure dropped back to 14.28 percent when the closed list system was 
subsequently replaced with an open list system.
11
  
Complimentary initiatives seek to enhance the role of women 
parliamentarians. The remit of the Stability Pact Gender Task Force is to increase 
„public awareness of women‟s political participation in elections and political 
processes in general; reform existing electoral systems and legislation…to promote 
women's political participation; establish governmental institutions to promote gender 
equality...‟.12 A 2001 conference on the theme of Partnership in Parliament – Strategic 
Steps towards Gender Equality in Sarajevo, for female members of the Parliament, 
NGO members and others called for „continuous education‟ for parliamentarians as 
well as other measures to encourage women to enter politics.
13
 Grassroots work has 
been sponsored to enhance women‟s broader influence on the peace-building and 
reform process, such as the „There Are More of Us, Let‟s Vote‟ campaign in 1998. 
The campaign was conducted under the auspices of the League of Women Voters, a 
coalition of women‟s NGOs backed by USAID and the OSCE. International 
organisations gave strong backing to the women‟s voter education project, although 
the turnout among women was relatively healthy, especially compared to that of 
young people. These projects are not simply concerned with ensuring that women 
vote, but also influencing how women vote by empowering them not to follow their 
(nationalist voting) menfolk. 
How effective is the quota system? The quota system has boosted the number 
of women standing in Bosnian elections, testifying that women can be politicians and 
providing role models for other women. Indeed, the idea of quota systems, whether 
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gender or ethnically-based, is not an alien concept to Bosnians as elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe. However, this familiarity with quota systems has made East European 
electorates more sceptical than international officials or women‟s NGOs about their 
impact. „In the former communist countries…quotas are typically rejected out of hand 
because they are seen as being parallel to the systems of appointment/election that 
prevailed under communism‟, a Stockholm-based research project on gender quotas 
admits.
14
 Bosnia‟s own pre-war quota system was widely criticised „for being merely 
symbolic‟15 – because many female politicians owed their position to their 
connections, their politics tended to simply echo that of their male colleagues.
16
 
Similarly, in Britain, the calibre of recent female politicians whose candidatures were 
secured through quotas has been unfavourably compared to that of their predecessors. 
Rather than a distinct voice, it was observed that „Blair‟s babes‟, as the 1997 intake 
were derogatorily named, were less likely to rebel and more likely to tow the 
government line than their male colleagues, even on matters touching on women‟s 
interests.
17
 Strikingly, international reports have commented on the generally poor 
calibre of female politicians in present-day Bosnia.
18
 Advocates concede some of 
these criticisms, but argue that quota systems provide professional experience and can 
therefore help develop their calibre.  
However, the stunted nature of political life under international governance is 
not conducive to improving the calibre of politicians. To focus on the poor calibre of 
politicial representatives side-steps the degraded nature of the political rights 
promoted by advocates of quotas. Consider the research by the Stockholm-based 
Gender Quotas project - which advocates parliamentary gender quotas and increasing 
women‟s political participation in Iraq and Afghanistan - while pointedly disregarding 
the lack of political self-determination in the two states under external regulation.
19
 
What political powers do any politicians have when all major policies are made by 
external powers? The image of re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic springs to 
mind. The weak calibre of Bosnian politicians is unsurprising given the artificial 
character of Bosnian political life under international governance (see Chandler, this 
collection). Women‟s advocates talk about ensuring the meaningful participation of 
women but without challenging the stunted and restricted nature of politics under 
international governance. What is the significance of more women becoming 
members of the Bosnian parliament when local politicians lack real political and 
legislative powers? Greater political representation, in this case, merely signifies a 
therapeutic inclusion since Bosnian politicians‟ role has been reduced to little more 
than role playing, rubber-stamping internationally determined legislation.  
A „so-called mandatory platform in which political parties have to take 
positions on the most important, vital issues for all people in BiH‟20 has been 
developed by the OSCE in its supervisory role. Over the last decade, not only has 
opposition to Dayton effectively been outlawed under international governance, but 
political candidates are expected to adhere to the wide-ranging policies determined by 
the international community. The, often controversial, reforms such as privatization or 
pension reforms go far beyond ethnic matters. Consequently, more women becoming 
politicians in Bosnia under international governance might be better understood as 
improved employment opportunities for some women rather than women‟s political 
empowerment. For all the image of women activists driving gender quotas, their 
introduction was bound up with the belief of international officials that female 
politicians would be more amenable than male politicians to international strategies 
and help legitimise international governance. Tellingly, these sorts of fast track 
 5 
gender empowerment approaches are a feature of other weak post-conflict countries 
under heavy external intervention such as Afghanistan or Rwanda. 
International officials hold a rather impoverished and undemocratic view of 
political participation. The very process of realising the Law on Gender Equality 
exemplifies how the population is marginalised from policy-making. International 
organisations were closely involved in drafting the gender equality law at every stage, 
so much so that even its style reflects how draft provisions spent much of their time 
being formulated in the English language rather than the language of the country. A 
snapshot of the process reveals how the Gender Coordination Group discussed a draft 
which was then „distributed for review to the International Community and NGOs 
dealing with the issues contained in the draft‟ in summer 2001. Only subsequent to 
this review did the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees begin organising „a 
public debate of the draft law‟.21 The public became involved following international 
determination - essentially to be instructed into its provisions. As such, the Law on 
Gender Equality, as with other such legislation, testifies to the powers of international 
officials over Bosnian public life rather than the empowerment of Bosnian women.  
In this understanding of politics, different social groups are formally 
represented, but political contest revolves around bureaucratic wrangling over quotas 
rather than competing political visions. Progressive thinking risks being stifled in the 
bureaucratic mindset and backroom deals that BiH‟s gender or ethnic quotas 
encourage (as was the experience of SFR Yugoslavia).
22
 Since representatives 
brought through a quota system owe their position to official sponsorship it should be 
no surprise that the women chosen are those regarded as the most loyal by their 
sponsors and also prove to be most loyal. Their dependence on official sponsorship 
rather than popular support predictably encourages quota candidates to take their 
political cue from their sponsors, whether their sponsorship derives from the main 
ethnically-based political parties or from the international community. Accountability 
to the constituency they ostensibly represent is also thereby weakened.   
Quota measures risk ossifying representation, institutionalising the position of 
quota representatives and insulating them from the need to galvanise popular support 
and address the core concerns of their constituencies. This criticism is particularly 
relevant to BiH, where a serious dichotomy exists between the gender parity required 
under the Law on Gender Equality and the social trends for women under 
international governance, discussed below. Quota systems can undoubtedly advance 
the position of women‟s representatives, but whether their advancement necessarily 
improves the circumstances of ordinary women is a moot point. The feminist political 
theorist Wendy Brown has warned that identity-based representation can create what 
she calls „wounded attachments‟, a category of representatives with a vested interest 
in the perpetuation of difference since their own position is premised on their 
identity‟s victimized status.23 The affirmative action approach of the Law on Gender 
Equality requiring measures to ensure equal gender representation „at all levels of 
government‟ does not involve any commitment to broader social changes which 
would enable ordinary women to realise parity of opportunities or of incomes. 
Arguably the strongest achievement of women‟s representatives has been securing 
retention of the gender quota system, i.e., protecting their own positions. They have 
been less successful in defending maternity provisions and other social rights relevant 
to ordinary women. 
The quota system casts doubt on representation per se, even as it assumes an 
identity of interests between women. The feminist movement back in the 1970s 
problematised the idea that the experiences of women, and therefore the interests of 
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different groups of women, were the same. Consequently if men cannot represent 
women‟s interests, as the gender quota system implies, and women‟s interests are not 
identical, how can it be assumed that urban middle class women can best represent the 
interests of working class or rural women? The Global Rights‟ „Shadow Report‟ 
observes of women politicians: „They view the status of all women in BiH through the 
lens of their own elevated success or position, and for women politicians in BiH, that 
status is generally far removed from the position of the average woman in the 
country.‟24 Again, other social divisions may be more salient, as analysis of women in 
Bosnia acknowledges.
25
 The limitations of this approach have meant that the potential 
role of women‟s organisations in the political empowerment of women has become a 
central focus. 
At first glance, women‟s involvement in civil society seems much more 
vibrant and to provide opportunities for women‟s grassroots activism. Advocates 
often present women‟s organisations as activists challenging a reluctant international 
community to support women‟s empowerment. More sober reports observe that 
women run many NGOs, although they have been reluctant to become involved in 
politics.
26
 Women‟s organisations have generally been exempt from the critical 
scrutiny that the rest of the NGO sector has come under during the past decade (see 
Adam Fagan, this volume). But women‟s organisations share many of the problems of 
NGOs in general, although, among researchers, there is a great reluctance to identify 
these problems, as if to do so would disempower women. 
Nevertheless, women‟s NGOs, like other local NGOs, are essentially 
orientated towards the international community and reliant on its continuing 
sponsorship for their survival and evidence a rather weak relation to the population. 
The observation that the NGO sector is dominated by a small minority of 
individuals
27
 equally applies to women‟s NGOs, typically dominated by a small 
number of individuals from the urban elite. Criticisms of female politicians made by 
the Global Rights‟ „Shadow Report‟ are relevant to women‟s NGOs.28 NGOs have 
failed to galvanise popular support among women and have no formal accountability 
to the population, unlike elected representatives. Without external sponsorship, many 
local women‟s NGOs would collapse.  
Tensions observed among women‟s organisations29 manifest their reliance on 
external funds and their need to compete for sponsorship from external donors. 
Competitiveness between NGOs has been exacerbated by the internationally-
sponsored NGO sector becoming an important arena of international investment 
relative to the rest of the economy. This phenomenon has encouraged the emergence 
of NGO entrepreneurs, or „anti-war profiteers‟ as they are nicknamed locally, whose 
livelihoods depend on the success of their organisation attracting external sponsorship 
as opposed to another. The proliferation of NGOs is therefore better understood as 
representing the needs of the urban professional class rather than representing any 
popular movement. Symptomatically, organisations are disinclined to merge or work 
together unless cooperating under externally-funded programmes. Even where 
individuals‟ involvement transcends these mundane motivations, the general problem 
remains that NGOs are primarily orientated towards gaining sponsorship from the 
international community rather than popular support. Indicatively, much of advocates‟ 
time is spent writing grant applications to international donors and implementing 
internationally-sponsored programmes. 
Unsurprisingly, the gender policies pursued by women advocates echo those 
of their international sponsors. Strong views against privatization and new laws 
reducing social rights exist in the population. Their negative impact on women is 
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acknowledged, but there is little evidence that the women‟s organisations, sponsored 
by international donors, are opposing these structural adjustment policies which are 
detrimental to women. The agenda of local women‟s organisations reflects the 
international emphasis on cultural and personal change rather than material 
advancement. Tellingly, the different interests among women, in so far as the problem 
is acknowledged, are conceptualised essentially in terms of cultural prejudices (urban 
versus rural), to be addressed by cultural awareness training programmes. Meanwhile, 
any economic improvements are envisaged as coming about through cultural and 
personal change. The following section considers these approaches to the economic 
empowerment of women. 
 
Economic empowerment 
 
A 1997 ILO report observes that international strategies after the war re-orientated 
their programming for women „away from therapy toward income generation, micro-
enterprise and skills training‟.30 Bosnian women had already been trying to use 
international projects to support income-generating activities. I found this when I 
visited the Mostar offices of Stope Nade in September 1997. The remit of the 
internationally-sponsored project
31
 typified the international focus on counselling of 
female (rape) victims, reproductive health and community peace-building. Local 
women were adapting its office in eastern Mostar for their own income-generating 
activities. Instead of encountering counsellors providing women with therapy, I was 
greeted with a makeup demonstration by a local (Bosniac) Avon lady. Previously, 
such activities would have been considered supplementary but today many 
households rely on them as their main income given Bosnia‟s unemployment.32 
Likewise international policy-makers increasingly rely on micro-enterprise as the core 
of their employment strategy, through organizations such Zene za Zene (Women for 
Women).  
Before examining micro-enterprise, I will briefly highlight how micro-
enterprise compliments international structural adjustment policies eroding state 
employment and welfare provision.
33
 This pattern is evident in Bosnia. Even before 
the war, women found themselves targeted for redundancy under restructuring 
programmes on the grounds that their salaries were secondary in the family. State 
sector employment has been important for women providing not only financial 
security but also fostering greater social independence as well as associated social 
benefits such as maternity pay and access to state nurseries. Nevertheless, in the name 
of promoting „a more flexible labour market‟34 and „reforming provisions that now 
keep women out of the labour market‟,35 women are losing protections they 
previously enjoyed such as „very long maternity leave, prohibitions against their 
doing night work etc‟.36 Yet women‟s NGOs have actually criticised female 
politicians for focusing „on maternity legislation and maternity rights as the most 
important women‟s issue‟ and falling into stereotypical women‟s issues,37 despite the 
pertinence of defending these rights now. The population is expected to lower its 
expectations and rely on private welfare provision. Human rights lawyers, for 
example, instruct that the right to health means basic health not up-to-date specialist 
cancer hospitals – despite the fact that breast cancer is a major killer of Bosnian 
women. In sum, international economic governance is increasing the social 
vulnerability of women and the social burden placed on them by authorising the 
further erosion of state support systems.  
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There is a need to rethink international economic governance because of its 
impact on women and Bosnian society as a whole. International neo-liberal economic 
policies, requiring the retreat of the state, have failed to regenerate the Bosnian 
economy to pre-war levels, and are exacerbating social inequalities.
38
 Internationally 
sponsored privatization policies are fostering „private affluence and public squalor‟, in 
the words of economist J. K. Galbraith. These policies are undermining the state‟s 
capacity to raise income through taxation and to regulate the informal economy, in 
turn undermining its capacity to enforce the rule of law and finance welfare provision. 
There has been the removal of „punitive levels of employee-related taxes and welfare 
provision‟, i.e., the erosion of employment rights in the private sector.39 The 
privatization programme has thereby reinforced the shadow, ethnicized, patrimonial 
economic networks, which evolved through the economic crisis and war economy.
40
 
World Bank research has found that the informal sector has actually grown in the last 
couple of years, not shrunk, employing 410,500 people, representing over a third of 
employment in the country.
41
 Women (and men), unable to rely on state employment 
or assistance, have had to resort to these shadow patrimonial economic networks as 
part of their survival strategies. Such patrimonial networks make women more subject 
to patriarchal relations. In sum, international economic governance implies women 
being more dependent on kinship ties, despite all its talk of gender policies. At best, 
gender equality legislation in the current circumstances ensures a fairer distribution of 
unemployment, social benefit cutbacks and poverty. Few women qualify, for 
example, for veteran benefits, such as exemptions from health service charges. 
Furthermore, international policy favours addressing anomalies by taking away 
benefits rather than expanding eligibility. 
International organisations have acknowledged that „privatising state firms 
will make things worse‟ for women, but nevertheless treat privatization as 
unavoidable.
42
 The ILO report refers to „the new realities‟ that Bosnians are having to 
grasp,
43
 the UNDP argues that privatization „is necessary and inevitable‟,44 and 
Global Rights: Partners for Justice accepts privatization „as an essential aspect of the 
country‟s economic reform program‟ but argues for more women representatives to 
be included in its implementation.
45
 Alternative economic models, which could give 
the state a greater role, have not been considered by international policy-makers.
46
 
Little love may be lost between BiH‟s constituent ethnic groups, but one issue that the 
population is unified over is the role of the state as provider. As international reports 
observe, „most people still expect “the state” to sort out their problems‟,47 as job 
creator if not welfare provider.
48
 Yet this affirmation of the state and suspicion of the 
private sector - a potentially powerful resource for state-building based on political 
and social consensus - tends to be dismissed by international officials as merely 
backward or outmoded prejudice. This is despite the fact that some rethinking on 
these questions is evident, even among Western policy-makers who previously 
advocated privatization and the rolling back of the state.
49
 Alternative economic 
models, giving a stronger role for the state to create a safety net, would have better 
protected women‟s welfare and the social gains women had made since 1945. 
Interestingly, SFR Yugoslavia managed to reach pre-war growth levels within five 
years of the end of the Second World War, whereas international officials do not 
expect BiH to reach pre-war growth levels until 2010.
50
 Moreover, even this forecast 
may be optimistic given current worsening trends.
51
  The 2003 UNDP Annual Report 
concluded that the current authorities are not offering „any effective solution to this 
problem‟ and that „the entire country can be considered a “welfare case”‟, even 
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allowing for involvement in the informal economy and remittances from relations 
abroad.
52
 
How does the international micro-enterprise approach address these serious 
economic problems which have hit women disproportionately, particularly female-
headed households?
53
 Micro-finance has not overlooked women. The World Bank has 
stated that fifty percent of clients are women.
54
 Indeed in the early years, international 
reports actually observed how men had difficulty accessing schemes.
55
 Advisers 
warned that since unemployment affected the majority of the population, micro-credit 
„should not be pressed to meet donor demands of heavy concentration on social 
categories.‟56 Over $30 million has been invested in two World Bank projects to 
develop a micro-credit industry in Bosnia, and there have been numerous ad hoc 
initiatives in addition. The World Bank programme is implemented via government 
foundations based in the FBiH and in RS.
57
 These two foundations have contracted 
with local micro-credit organisations to administer the loans. Micro-credit 
organisations receiving contracts have consolidated based on performance. At the end 
of June 2003, the World Bank reported that 201,421 loans had been distributed with 
around 51,000 active clients,
58
 a third up from the previous year.
59
 The spread of 
micro-finance is regionally uneven, but prevalent across both entities. The highest 
activism is recorded in Podrinje (in RS) and in Sarajevo-Rumenija, Tuzla, and 
Western Herzegovina (in FBiH), involving over 2.5 percent of the population in these 
four regions.
60
 The average loan was recorded the previous year to be 3,122 KM 
(£1,050 approximately).
61
 Loans for agriculture and small farming had risen to 39 
percent.
62
 Women managed seven out of the thirteen BiH micro-credit organisations 
listed as important by the World Bank.
63
 
The analysis here is less concerned with questions of access to micro-credit as 
much as with its centrality to international strategies and how the approach embodies 
low expectations for the advancement of women. Micro-finance has become 
important as public sector work has declines while capital investment remains scarce. 
An ILO/UNHCR micro-finance study admits that micro-finance is about helping 
people survive, „the only possible alternative people may turn to in order to earn 
enough for survival is self-employment through private entrepreneurship‟.64  
However, the future of the small-scale private entrepreneurship envisaged for BiH is 
insecure given the population‟s weak purchasing power and competition from 
imports. Subsidies or tariffs, which might protect the local market, are eschewed 
under international economic governance.
65
 
Essentially, micro-enterprise represents a shift from state responsibility for 
employment and a structural understanding of unemployment to an individualized 
understanding of unemployment, addressing the employability of individuals, i.e., 
their skills and motivation. Accordingly, the UN Common Country Study for BiH 
speaks of changing from an economy based on large state industries to one which 
„places more responsibility on the shoulders of individual entrepreneurs and 
workers‟.66 Micro-credit caught the imagination of international policy-makers as 
empowering women, building upon the Grameen Bank initiative in Bangladesh. Yet, 
detailed research on these initiatives suggests that micro-credit has only led to modest 
gains for women. Indeed, micro-credit is frequently only made available to married 
women or widows, questioning the idea of micro-credit as emancipating women.
67
 
Interestingly, the rates of interest are not necessarily better than those of private 
lenders,
68
 as is the case in Bosnia.
69
 Micro-credit schemes, providing small capital 
investment, can only initiate small-scale household production, unless the loans are 
used to support existing family businesses. In Bosnia, it has been observed that „the 
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impact of micro-finance programs on enterprise development has been greater when 
people were relatively less vulnerable and had a stronger enterprise to start with‟.70 As 
a director of micro-finance has advised „micro-finance alone cannot reduce poverty, it 
can only supplement a comprehensive development programme‟.71 Yet micro-credit 
has become the central employment strategy despite the fact that it only appears to 
secure the position of women within their existing social roles. 
Micro-enterprise, based on small-scale labour-intensive production or 
gendered service sector work, such as hairdressing,
72
 simply does not address the 
employment expectations of Bosnian women of working age and instead represents a 
step backwards. As a joint ILO/UNHCR report states: „In BiH, the low-income 
entrepreneur may well be an electronic engineer with twenty years experience‟.73 
Take the generation of women now entering their forties; many are newly poor with a 
relatively high education level.
74
 This generation, even if they grew up in rural 
communities, aspired to work in the public sector, whether service provision, 
administration or public companies, or to set up their own businesses. Related to the 
latter, there was a certain gendered aspect to those able to start family-sponsored 
businesses: men would be in charge of cafes (predominantly for male clientele), 
women would run family shops. They did not desire or expect to remain in labour-
intensive agriculture or other labour-intensive household production. Such a way of 
life was viewed as backbreaking, anachronistic and only generating small returns - a 
fate they wished to escape. Despite these aspirations, the UN Common Country Study 
for Bosnia suggests that „it is easy for planners and bankers alike to still aim too high 
and overlook “micro” enterprise that are often important income sources for women-
headed households‟.75 
Micro-enterprise sounds more glamorous than petty trade, but the latter 
description is closer to the nature of the activities. The numerous hairdressing or taxi 
businesses make a scant living as they vie for customers and the purchasing power of 
the population is „more than weak, after meeting existential needs‟.76 Moreover, the 
locally produced goods are often uncompetitive compared to imports, as analysis 
readily admits.
77
 The returns from small-scale agricultural production are also 
insecure – women (or their children) competing to sell home-made preserves along 
the main Sarajevo-Mostar road in the baking heat of summer have few buyers. 
Likewise, only a limited market exists for the production of handicrafts so beloved by 
micro-credit advocates. Turnover is visibly slow even for well-established businesses 
in Bascarsija, the old Turkish commercial district in Sarajevo, competing to sell 
traditional crafts to international officials as „tourism is practically non-existent‟78. 
Some projects have sought to train women for work in non-traditional sectors, such as 
computing.
79
 The focus is still on the employability of individuals, as if 
unemployment could be addressed merely by middle-aged women acquiring modern 
skills. In reality, skilled people also lack jobs and (particularly the young) only see a 
viable future abroad.
80
 
Micro-enterprise may work as a coping strategy or a form of occupational 
therapy, but it does not provide secure employment or advance women‟s position. As 
international reports admit, involvement in micro-enterprise is no advancement for the 
many qualified women who have lost their jobs over the last decade. Interestingly, the 
World Bank has drastically reduced the figures for employment provided by micro-
finance from over 180,000, claimed in 2002,
81
 to 100,000 in 2003, despite its dramatic 
increase in loans.
82
 Failure to generate secure employment perhaps explains why 
international reports often draw attention to micro-finance‟s impact on clients‟ 
confidence and „individual and group motivation‟.83 This emphasis on attitudes rather 
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than material circumstances indicates how international policy-makers would rather 
psychologize social problems. 
In contrast to the present post-conflict situation, women experienced 
unprecedented social gains after the Second World War. Within a decade, large 
numbers of women, whose mothers had been illiterate and engaged in subsistence 
farming, went to school and gained employment in the public sector, widening their 
horizons and challenging the patriarchical extended family structures. Consider the 
establishment of the huge agricultural processing enterprise Agrokomerc in Kladusa, 
north-west Bosnia, at one time employing over 13,000 employees, but collapsing in a 
notorious promissory notes scandal. Whatever criticisms can be levelled at the 
running of Agrokomerc, it did have a socially transformative impact on women‟s 
lives in Kladusa, a poor, isolated region holding very traditional attitudes towards 
women. Employment at the plant meant entry into the wage economy and experience 
of work outside the home, giving women new economic and social independence. In 
turn the factory created new purchasing power and sparked off other businesses in the 
area to service the wants of Agrokomerc and its employees. Women from Kladusa 
still nostalgically recall the opening of Agrokomerc‟s factory and how women‟s new 
financial independence enabled them to shake-off their submissiveness and begin 
challenging their husbands‟ authority.  
In contrast, the petty trading that characterises much micro-enterprise 
represents a form of disguised unemployment. Unsurprisingly, micro-enterprise lacks 
the socially transformative impact that the massive expansion of public sector 
employment had after the Second World War. Instead, social transformation is tagged 
on, for example, by adding „a gender awareness and assertiveness component‟ to 
skills training and employment promotion programmes.
84
 As a NGO delegate stated at 
a recent inter-regional conference, held in Srebrenica, on the Law on Gender Equality, 
„it is difficult to speak about gender equality when it comes to employment… Here, 
neither men nor women are successful in finding jobs, for there are none.‟85 
Nevertheless, her conclusions emphasised citizen „education and motivation‟ and the 
„awakening‟ of women.86 Once again, tending to represent issues of social 
development as being capable of resolution at the psychological level of an 
individual‟s attitude towards others and views of themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In BiH, we are presented with the picture of enlightened internationals struggling to 
bring progressive gender ideas to an intransigent, backward, patriarchal and abusive 
culture. If progressive ideas on women are not flourishing in Bosnia, it should be no 
surprise given that women and men are expected to lower their aspirations in so many 
aspects of their lives. Gender may legitimise international governance and empower a 
few female members of the urban elite, but the prospects of advancing the position of 
ordinary Bosnian women under international governance are illusory.  
On the contrary, analysis of international policy-making in this sphere 
suggests that the emphasis on gender empowerment fits closely with the top-down 
approach of international policy development. International administrators seem much 
happier developing policies which are susceptible to bureaucratic target-setting – such 
as quotas and micro-credit – as opposed to policies capable of generating real changes 
in the political, social and economic opportunities of Bosnian women. 
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